Adam’s Nonsensical Ontological Argument

Here I go again with more of this think­ing stuff. You ever get the feel­ing that you’ve thought of some­thing mind­blow­ing and then find out lat­er that some­one else thought about it 100s of years before you and it was prob­a­bly just chill­ing in your sub­con­scious? Yeah, I hate that. So a few days ago I was blab­ber­ing about ontol­ogy to lit­tle avail. Almost a year ago I was blab­ber­ing on the nature of know­ing to basi­cal­ly the same end.

And now, last night, they, unsur­pris­ing­ly in ret­ro­spect, merged. [damn lot­ta com­mas] So I guess this is my ver­sion of the onto­log­i­cal argu­ment. It ends with God = Noth­ing, which is rather sur­pris­ing.

Assume:
x = some­thing
y = noth­ing
z = God

If y ⊆ x exists, where y is a sub­set of x, and z ⊆ x exists, where z is a sub­set of x, then y = z.

Pos­tu­lates†:

1. Is y a sub­set of x?
   • If x is the set of all that exists then y exists. Ergo, y is a sub­set of x.
2. Are y and x oppo­sites?
   • At first blush it seems so, but if y were not a sub­set of x then y would not exist. [i usu­al­ly start bog­gling at this point.]

Proof†:
If y DNE then there would be no con­cept of y.
There is a con­cept of y. Mere dis­cus­sion of y proves this.
There­fore, y exists.
If z DNE then there would be no con­cept of z.
There is a con­cept of z. Mere dis­cus­sion of z proves this.
There­fore, z exists.
If y exists and z exists and they are both sub­sets of x, then y equals z.

Fal­lac­i­es†:
I am equat­ing the con­cep­tu­al with the fac­tu­al. I have appar­ent­ly also decid­ed that every­thing in the set of x is mutu­al­ly exclu­sive to every­thing else. So it appears that every­thing is per­mit­ted. So lets do what­ev­er we want.